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PEOPLE v. CAHILL, CALIFORNIA AND COERCED
CONFESSIONS-"HARMLESS" EVIDENTIAlRY
BOMBSHELLS

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Chapman v. California' held that certain constitutional errors may be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt-"harmless errors"-thus not requiring an automatic
reversal of a criminal conviction.2 Chapman spawned an enormous
progeny of cases, 3 including the recent decision in Arizona v. Fulmi1. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
2. Id. at 22. See infra part IV.D.2.a for a thorough discussion of the analytical framework employed in harmless-error review. Basically, an appellate court must examine all of the
evidence, including the coerced confession, and determine whether a guilty verdict would have
been rendered absent the coerced confession. In other words, a coerced confession was harmless if the guilty verdict was "surely unattributable" to the improperly admitted coerced confession. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993).
3. In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
listed a wide variety of cases involving harmless constitutional errors:
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-754 (1990) (unconstitutionally overbroad
jury instructions at the sentencing stage of a capital case); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486
U.S. 249 (1988) (admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital case in
violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Carella v. California, 491 U.S.
263, 266 (1989) (jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive presumption);
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-504 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element
of the offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (jury instruction containing an
erroneous rebuttable presumption); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986)
(erroneous exclusion of defendant's testimony regarding the circumstances of his
confession); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (restriction on a defendant's right to cross examine a witness for bias in violation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-118, and n. 2 (1983) (denial of a defendant's right to be present at trial); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499 (1983) (improper comment on defendant's silence at trial, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982)
(statute improperly forbidding trial court's giving a jury instruction on a lesser included offense in a capital case in violation of the Due Process Clause); Kentucky v.
Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of
innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (admission of identification
evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause); Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-232 (1973) (admission of the out-of-court statement
of a nontestifying codefendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (confession obtained in violation
of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 52-53 (1970) (admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970) (denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause).
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306-07.
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nante.4 In Fulminante the Court held that coerced or involuntary confessions5 are now subject to the Chapman harmless-error standard.6
The decision represented a doctrinal departure from a "vast body of
precedent . . . [and] dislodge[d] one of the fundamental tenets of our
criminal justice system." 7 Fulminante "came out of nowhere, went
against hundreds of years of historical and legal analysis on the effect of
coerced confessions, and opened the door to major abuses in the criminal
justice system." 8 The decision "send[s] us back to the Inquisition and
the Star Chamber straightaway." 9 These graphic descriptions underscore the Fulminante holding's devastating impact: A criminal defendant's improperly admitted, coerced confession warrants merely harmless4. 499 U.S. 279. Fulminante was decided by a narrow five-to-four vote. Id. at 281. Justice White delivered the lead opinion with respect to the primary issue, concluding that the
defendant's confession was both coerced and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
302. However, the portion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion that subjected coerced confessions to the harmless-error rule commanded a majority of the Court. Id. at 302-03. Joining
the Chief Justice were Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter. Id. For a discussion
of Fulminante and its effects, see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante" The Harm
of Applying Harmless Errorto Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152 (1991); Dale W.
Aronson, Note, Constitutional Law-Harmless Constitutional Error Analysis-Are Coerced
Confessions FundamentallyDifferent from Other Erroneously Admitted Evidence?, Arizona v.
Fulminante 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991), 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 581 (1992); Amy B. Bloom,
Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Harmless-ErrorAnalysis Applies to Erroneously Admitted Coerced Confessions-Arizona v. Fulminante, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 269 (1992); Robert J.
Fratianne, Note, California and the Coerced Confession: The Effect of Arizona v. Fulminante-Did the Supreme Court Go FarEnough?, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 285 (1991); and Joan M.
Galli, Note, Arizona v. Fulminante: Pavingthe Way for the 'Harmless'Coerced Confession, 36
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 409 (1991).
5. These terms are used interchangeably and refer to "confessions obtained by physical or
psychological coercion, by promises of leniency or benefit, or when the 'totality of circumstances' indicate[s] the confession was not a product of the defendant's 'free and rational
choice.'" People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 482 n.1, 853 P.2d 1037, 1040 n.l, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
582, 585 n.1 (1993) (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2, at 439-51 (1984); 1 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §§ 614-623, at 588-604
(3d ed. 1986)).
6. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 303.
7. Id. at 289 (White, J., dissenting). One of the underpinnings of the American-adversarial--criminal justice system is that the accused cannot be forced to testify against him or
herself. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(b), at
42-43 (1984). Indeed this principle is memorialized in the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which states that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."
8. Richard Barbieri, Argument May Be Last Gaspfor Automatic ReversalRule, THE RECORDER, Apr. 1, 1993, at 1, 7 (quoting Los Angeles deputy public defenders Laurence Sarnoff
and Douglas Goldstein).
9. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 512, 853 P.2d at 1060, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk was referring to the California Supreme Court's adoption of the Fulminante holding. See id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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error treatment, instead of an automatic reversal of the resulting convic-

tion.1" Automatic reversal, one of the legal system's most potent weap-

ons to counter police abuse and ensure judicial fairness, effectively has

been replaced by a penetrable shield, one that is easily pierced by "harmlessness." Interestingly, in Chapman itself, the Court held "that there

are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction
can never be treated as harmless error.""' Coerced confessions were specifically mentioned in this category. 12 Thus, Fulminante was an unwar-

ranted and indefensible departure from a litany of principled
jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding minimum federal constitutional standards, however, states are free to adopt more stringent safeguards in protecting defendants' rights. 13 California's recent decision in People v. Cahil114
represents the state high court's decision to follow the United States
Supreme Court's treatment of coerced confessions."5 Cahill also embod-

ies an unprecedented and unwarranted departure from prior jurisprudence: Previously, California had steadfastly adhered to a reversible-per10. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10.
11. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
12. See id. at 23 n.8 (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)). The notion that
improperly admitted coerced confessions mandate a new trial dates back to 1897. See Brain v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897).
The Chapman Court cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) as examples of the types of errors for which the Chapman harmlesserror analysis is never appropriate. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8. Gideon held that each
criminal defendant is entitled to counsel, 372 U.S. at 342, and Tumey held that a criminal
defendant is entitled to an impartial judge, 273 U.S. at 535.
13. See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893), where Justice Field's
dissent stated that
the Constitution of the United States ... recognizes and preserves the autonomy and
independence of the States-independence in their legislative and independence in
their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution
specially authorized or delegated to the United States.
Id. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting); see also State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988) (invalidating six-member juries under state constitution). The Hamm court stated that "the conclusion of the United States Supreme Court . . . that the Sixth Amendment to the federal
constitution does not mandate 12-person juries, is of little relevance here today." Id. at 382.
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." This provision has been interpreted as an
explicit affirmation of states' police power. See generally JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1.01 (1993)
(discussing State courts' power to grant greater protections under state constitutions than
those afforded under U.S. Constitution).
14. 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993).
15. Id. at 509-10, 853 P.2d at 1059, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604.
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se rule 16 that automatically mandated a new trial when coerced confessions had been improperly admitted into evidence.' 7
This Note begins by summarizing the historical treatment, in both
federal'" and California cases, of coerced confessions. Then it reviews
the majority and dissenting opinions in Cahill. The ensuing analysis
demonstrates that the majority's opinion is founded in neither precedent
nor persuasive reasoning; instead, hundreds of years of sound, fair precedent have been needlessly disemboweled. Finally, this Note recommends
that if a coerced confession is admitted into evidence, the resulting conviction must be automatically overturned and a new trial granted.
II.

FEDERAL AND STATE PRECEDENT REGARDING COERCED
CONFESSIONS

A.

FederalHistoricalDevelopment

Since 1897 the Supreme Court had adhered to a reversible-per-se
rule regarding coerced confessions.' 9 In Fulminante, however, the Court
abandoned the "axiomatic [proposition] that a defendant in a criminal
case is deprived of due process of law, [thus requiring an automatic reversal], if his conviction is founded ...upon an involuntary confession,
without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession." 2
Ironically, the Chapman Court categorically excluded involuntary
confessions from harmless-error treatment 2 ' because they "'affect [the]
substantial rights' of a party."22 However, in Fulminante Chief Justice
Rehnquist mustered enough support2 3 to sustain the proposition that
"[t]he admission of an involuntary confession... [is] a classic 'trial er16. See infra part IV.A.
17. See infra part IV.A.
18. This Note will primarily focus on the California Supreme Court's treatment of coerced
confessions. However, a basic understanding of the United States Supreme Court's doctrine in
this area is necessary to fully understand Cahill'ssignificance. Although the Cahill majority
professes otherwise, see Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 486-87, 853 P.2d at 1042-43, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
587-88, its holding is inextricably bound up in federal law.
19. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) is generally regarded as the seminal decision. See Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 518-19, 853 P.2d at 1065, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (listing United States Supreme Court cases that held admission of coerced confession at trial required automatic reversal).
20. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,
543-44 (1961)).
21. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 19, 23 (1967) (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958)).
22. Id.
23. See supra note 4.
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ror,'" subject merely to harmless-error analysis.24 Although the Chief
Justice recognized the potentially devastating effect of an improperly admitted involuntary confession, 25 he no doubt assuaged potential defendants' fears by stating that a reviewing court could still find certain errors
harmful.26
B.

CaliforniaHistoricalDevelopment
1. People v. O'Bryan

Unlike the United States Constitution, the California Constitution
explicitly sets forth a standard for reviewing reversible errors.27 Basically, an error will not be grounds for reversing a conviction unless it 2is
8
so egregious that it can be characterized as a "miscarriage of justice."
Soon after enactment, the California Supreme Court interpreted this provision in People v. O'Bryan.2 9
In O'Bryan the defendant was a union member striking against various employers.30 Early one morning, the defendant encountered two
nonunion employees of the Llewellyn Iron Works.3 1 O'Bryan, who had
a gun, and two companions eventually overtook the nonunion workers,
one of whom began to flee.3 2 After he unsuccessfully ordered the worker
to stop running, O'Bryan shot and killed him.3 3
The facts before the court were uncontroverted a4 The only issue
was whether O'Bryan's statements before the grand jury should have
been admitted at his trial.3 " The majority explained that "[h]e was not
24. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
25. See id. at 312.
26. Id.
27. Reversible errors are those errors that prejudice the defendant to such a great degree as
to constitute a "miscarriage ofjustice." See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13. More simply, reversible errors deny a criminal defendant fairness in the proceedings against him or her.
28. CAL. CONsr. art. VI, § 4 1/2 was added in 1911, amended in 1914 to apply to civil as
well as criminal cases, and later moved to its current location. It states that
[n]o judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of
misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for
any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure,
unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13.
29. 165 Cal. 55, 130 P. 1042 (1913).
30. Id. at 58, 130 P. at 1043.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 61, 130 P. at 1044.
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informed of his constitutional right to decline to be a witness against

himself, nor was he warned that his statements might be used against
him."'3 6 Although the court concluded that O'Bryan's statements were
declarations against interest and not confessions, 3 7 it nevertheless held

that the statements should not have been admitted. 8
The court then had to consider whether a "miscarriage of justice"
had resulted from the error. In attempting to define this standard, Justice Sloss, writing for the court, stated that "[ilt is... difficult to frame a
definition ... which shall be 'at once perspicuous, comprehensive and

satisfactory.' ,39 Ultimately, the court declined to formulate an exacting
test, instead directing judges to use their best judgment in determining
whether the error had caused any injury." Justice Sloss then drafted a
general guideline to be employed in reviewing coerced confessions:

When we speak of administering "justice" in criminal cases,
under the English or American system of procedure, we mean
something more than merely ascertaining whether an accused
is or is not guilty. It is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly
legal procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected."
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The court stated that the testimony violated the "constitutional right of every person
not to 'be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.'" Id. (quoting CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 13 (repealed 1974)).
Like an admission, a declaration against interest does not result in the same level of incriminating impact as does a confession. See People v. Ferdinand, 194 Cal. 555, 568-69, 229 P.
341, 346 (1924). It is merely one piece of evidence used in conjunction with other incriminating evidence to identify and convict the accused. See id. More simply, a declaration against
interest is a statement by the accused-or another witness-that does not admit guilt, but
rather tends to prove an element of the crime charged. Id. The California Evidence Code
defines a declaration against interest as a statement that
was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render
invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an
object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man
in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1230 (West 1966).
39. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. at 65, 130 P. at 1046.
40. See id. In People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 846 (1957), the court attempted to define "miscarriage of justice": "[A] 'miscarriage of
justice' should be declared only when the court, 'after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence,' is of the 'opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." Id. at
836, 299 P.2d at 254.
41. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. at 65, 130 P. at 1046.
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In reaching its conclusion that there was no miscarriage of justice,

and thus no need for a new trial, the court focused its analysis on
whether a guilty verdict would have been reached had the error not been
committed.4 2 In other words, a reviewing court must assume an "intellectual omniscience" and determine what decision a reasonable cross-sec-

tion of the community would have rendered without the error.
O'Bryan represents the Cahill majority's starting point for California's reversible-error jurisprudence.4 3 However, it is important to re-

member that O'Bryan did not concern coerced confessions, but rather
admissions against interest." Also, Justice Mosk's dissent points out
several other deficiencies in the majority's reliance on O'Bryan as prece-

dential authority.4"
2.

O'Bryan's progeny

The Cahill majority asserted that prior to 1958, California had expressly adopted a harmless-error approach to coerced confessions. 4 6
However, Justice Mosk's dissent discredited the line of cases the majority

cited to support its reasoning and insisted that California has followed a
reversible-per-se rule for over 100 years.47 In any event, all justices
agreed that since 1958, California had strictly adhered to a rule of auto-

matic reversal.48
42. Id. at 66, 130 P. at 1046-47.
43. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 488, 853 P.2d at 1044, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589. However, Justice
Mosk noted that the reversible-error standard was employed prior to 1911. See id. at 524, 853
P.2d at 1069, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See infra part IV.A.2.b.i for a
complete discussion of pre-1911 reversible-error jurisprudence.
44. In dissent Justice Mosk defined a confession as a "declaration of [the] defendant's
intentional participation in a criminal act." Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 541 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1080 n.8,
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625 n.8 (Mosk, J., dissenting). He contrasted that with an admission,
which is a "recital of facts tending to establish guilt when considered with the remaining evidence in the case." Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
45. See infra part IV.A.2.b.i-ii.
46. See infra part IV.A.2 for a chronological analysis of California's treatment of coerced
confessions.
47. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 542, 853 P.2d at 1080, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See infra part IV.A.2.b.i for a detailed discussion of California's treatment of coerced
confessions prior to 1911.
48. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 542, 853 P.2d at 1080, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
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People v. Berve

In 1958 the court dealt with the issue of coerced confessions admitted at trial in People v. Berve.4 9 In Berve the defendant had allegedly
performed an abortion using unsterilized instruments, proximately causing the death of Mrs. Pettit.5 0 Thereafter, the decedent's husband kidnapped Mr. Berve and tortured him."1 Shortly after he was beaten, a
police officer "rescued" Mr. Berve; the officer arrested him and took him
to the police station.5 2 About one-half hour later, the officer began interrogating the defendant. 3 Mr. Berve received neither medical attention
nor the opportunity to clean himself; in fact, during the entire interrogation, the defendant "was so confused that he showed complete temporal
disorientation." 54 The defendant eventually confessed to having performed the abortion and was found guilty of second degree murder at
5
trial. "
The California Supreme Court held that the defendant's confession
was coerced and thus should not have been admitted into evidence at the
trial.5 6 Noting the exhausting and terrifying circumstances leading up to
the confession, the court found that Mr. Berve's due process rights had
been flagrantly violated. 7 By analogy, the court stated that if threatening to arrest one's mother is sufficient to constitutionally invalidate a
confession, there is no doubt that Mr. Berve's confession was likewise
inadmissible. 8 Accordingly, the court ordered a new trial.5 9
49. 51 Cal. 2d 286, 332 P.2d 97 (1958), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853
P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993).

50. Id. at 288, 332 P.2d at 98.
51. The court stated that
[Mr.] Pettit showed the defendant a bullet from the rifle and told him that it was
"his" bullet if he did not confess to killing Mrs. Pettit. [Mr. Pettit] commanded the
defendant to stare at the bullet for long periods while Pettit threatened his life. Pettit
drummed it into the defendant's mind that he must confess or die. ...Then while
Pettit pointed his rifle at the defendant, another man beat him with his fists. For
almost two hours defendant was kicked and slugged with shoes, fists and furniture .... The kidnapers pushed his head through a window, cutting him.
Id. at 289, 332 P.2d at 98.
52. Id.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 288, 332 P.2d at 98.
56. Id. at 293, 332 P.2d at 101.
57. Id. The only person involved with the trial who believed otherwise was the interrogating officer who stated "that the confession was free and voluntary 'as far as he could observe.'" Id. at 290, 332 P.2d at 99.
58. See id. at 291, 332 P.2d at 100 (citing People v. Mellus, 134 Cal. App. 219, 223-26, 25
P.2d 237, 240 (1933)).
59. Id. at 293, 332 P.2d at 101.
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People v. Brommel

Three years after Berve, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Brommel. ° Unlike Berve, Brommel did not involve an involuntary
confession obtained through physical coercion, but instead entailed explicit promises of leniency from governmental officials. 61 The defendant
was convicted of second degree murder for the death of his twenty-threemonth-old daughter.6 2 On appeal the defendant argued that his multiple
confessions were the result of police threats emanating from the officers'
63
disbelief of his statements during questioning.
The court ruled that the police threats amounted to coercion, and
"however strong the case otherwise [is,] the admission of involuntary
confessions compels a reversal, and section 4 1/2, article VI, of the [Cali''
fornia] Constitution can under no circumstances save the judgment."
c.

People v. Parham

People v. Parham65 diverged from the Berve-Brommel path because
it involved not a coerced confession, but illegally obtained evidence.66
60. 56 Cal. 2d 629, 364 P.2d 845, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5
Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993).
61. Id. at 632-34, 364 P.2d at 846-48, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 910-12.
62. Id. at 631, 364 P.2d at 846, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
63. The court recorded the officers' statements as follows:
"We have a little paper down here that wants to know how your ability is to tell
the truth, whether you sit down and told the truth about it, or whether you lied
about it, and if we write across there that this person would not tell the truth, on
many opportunities, we gave him the chance to tell the truth, but he absolutely refused to tell any truth about it at all-in other words, if we just wrote one word
across there, Liar, that would-you can go up before that judge and you can ask him
for all the breaks in the world, and he is not going to believe you because when a man
tells a lie, then even the truth becomes a lie because he is branded as a liar.
"Now if you want to meet that judge that way, if you want to meet your maker
that way, well, brother, that is up to you."
Id. at 633, 364 P.2d at 847-48, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 911-12 (quoting officer interrogating
defendant).
64. Id. at 634, 364 P.2d at 848, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 912 (citing People v. Trout, 54 Cal. 2d
576, 354 P.2d 231, 6 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1960), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853
P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993)). The court referred to other examples of similar police
conduct that had likewise invalidated confessions. Id. at 632, 364 P.2d at 846-47, 15 Cal.
Rptr. at 910-11 (citing People v. Gonzales, 136 Cal. 666, 668, 69 P. 487, 488 (1902) ("[T]he
sheriff would do whatever he could for him, and . . . 'he had better come out and tell the
truth.' "); People v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 452, 454 (1871) ("[I]f they would come in and confess
th[en] it would be lighter with them.")).
65. 60 Cal. 2d 378, 384 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945
(1964).
66. Id. at 384, 384 P.2d at 1004, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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Parham'simport lies not in its actual holding,6 7 but rather in its discus-

sion of coerced confessions.6" In Parham, the police clubbed and choked
the defendant in order to extract physical evidence-a check he was at-

tempting to swallow-from his mouth.6 9 The court held that it would be
improvident to reverse a conviction where erroneously admitted evidence
had no bearing on the outcome of a trial. 70 Harmless-error analysis precluded overturning the conviction.71
Regardless of the ultimate holding concerning the illegally obtained

evidence, the unanimous court declared, in dicta, that involuntary confessions must be treated "as a class by themselves and [judges cannot] ...
inquire whether in rare cases their admission in evidence had no bearing
on the result."' 72 The court's classification of coerced confessions as "sui
generis" evidence was extremely important and has since been espoused
by numerous legal scholars and judges.73
d.

People v. Schader

The California Supreme Court's next major decision in this area,
People v. Schader,74 concerned an erroneously admitted involuntary confession. 75 The two defendants were both found guilty of first degree murder for killing a police officer. 76 At trial, Schader argued that he asked

for but was denied counsel before his confession. 77 An investigating officer testified that the defendant never made such a request. 78 The judge
67. The defendant's conviction on three counts of first degree robbery was affirmed by the
California Supreme Court. Id. at 386, 384 P.2d at 1006, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
68. Id. at 385, 384 P.2d at 1005, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
69. The police were attempting to obtain a check in the defendant's possession because in
each of three previous bank robberies, the robber had used either a pink piece of paper or a
check to demand money. Id. at 384, 384 P.2d at 1004, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
70. See id. at 386, 384 P.2d at 1005, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 385, 384 P.2d at 1005, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
73. See infra part IV.D.
74. 62 Cal. 2d 716, 401 P.2d 665, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1965), overruledby People v. Cahill, 5
Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993).
75. The court explicitly stated that "[a]s to its impact upon the jury and the prejudicial
effect, the confession obtained in violation of defendant's right to counsel cannot be distinguished from the confession obtained in violation of defendant's right to be free of coercion."
Id. at 729, 401 P.2d at 673, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 201. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction in
this case was overturned since he was denied counsel before his confession. Id. at 733, 401
P.2d at 675, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
76. Id. at 719, 401 P.2d at 666, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
77. Id. at 727, 401 P.2d at 671, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
78. Id.
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issued a limiting instruction to the jury that it must not consider the
confession if Schader had requested but been denied counsel.7 9
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the defendant's
confession had been improperly admitted into evidence." The court
noted that if Schader had in fact asked for counsel and was denied, the
confession was inadmissible."1 Alternatively, even if Schader had not requested counsel, his confession was nevertheless involuntary-and hence
inadmissible-since the record did not indicate that he confessed knowing that he was entitled to counsel.8 2
Writing for the court, Justice Tobriner stated that the defendant was
entitled to a new trial since "the erroneous admission of a confession is
prejudicial per se and therefore compels reversal." 3 Even if there was
other corroborating evidence supporting the conviction, "the admission
in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 84
The prosecution offered a last-ditch argument to maintain the conviction: Since Schader's confession was voluntarily obtained, it was
likely to be more trustworthy than an involuntarily obtained confession-thereby diminishing the prejudicial effect upon the jury.
The
court rejected this argument, concluding that the "confession operate[d]
as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatter[ed] the defense."8 6
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964) (finding error when trial court admitted evidence elicited from suspect where suspect had requested and been denied counsel
prior to making statement).
82. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d at 727, 401 P.2d at 671, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (citing People v.
Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965),
and overruledby People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993)).
In Dorado, the court ruled that a confession was inadmissible because authorities had informed
the defendant of neither his right to counsel nor his right to remain silent, and no evidence
established that the defendant had waived these rights. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 35354, 398 P.2d 361, 371, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 179, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965), and overruled
by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993).
83. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d at 728, 401 P.2d at 672, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
84. Id. at 729, 401 P.2d at 673, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (quoting Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560, 568 (1958)).
85. Id. at 730, 401 P.2d at 674, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
86. Id. at 731, 401 P.2d at 674, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 202 (emphasis added).
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People v. Jacobson

Like Schader, People v. Jacobson8 7 dealt with confessions obtained
in violation of a defendant's right to counsel."8 The defendant was sentenced to death after being convicted of first degree murder for the death
of his twenty-one-month-old daughter.8 9 The court first noted that the
defendant made approximately ten separate confessions or admissions. 90
Two of these statements were deemed inadmissible because they were
made while the defendant was in custody and without the aid of
counsel.9 1
Writing for the court, Justice Mosk 92 declared that the underlying

rationale for treating inadmissible confessions as grounds for a new trial
is different in California than under federal law. 93 The federal view

maintains that a conviction based on an improperly obtained confession
must be overturned in order to penalize law enforcement officials-it "is
the only means by which illegal police activity can be successfully
checked." 94 Conversely, California law has observed a reversible-per-se
rule founded on "the fairness of the trial," which prevents courts from
"inquir[ing] into the prejudicial nature of the introduction of an illegally
95
obtained confession."
Nonetheless, the majority found that Jacobson was a "rare case" in
which inquiry into the prejudicial impact of the illegal confessions was

necessary to comport with article VI, section 4 1/2 of the California Constitution. 96 Focusing on the vast number of independent, incriminating

statements-only two of which were inadmissible-the court distinguished the typical involuntary confession situation in which the only
confession has been coerced. 97 Since none of the statements carried a
87. 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 P.2d 555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1015
(1966).
88. See supra note 75.
89. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d at 322, 405 P.2d at 557, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
90. Id. at 331, 405 P.2d at 563, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
91. Id. at 328-29, 405 P.2d at 561-62, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 521-22.
92. Justice Mosk authored a vigorous dissent in Cahill in which he asserted that the majority had improperly interpreted his holding in Jacobson. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 539-40, 853
P.2d at 1079, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
93. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d at 330, 405 P.2d at 562, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
94. Id. at 329, 405 P.2d at 562, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
95. Id. at 330, 405 P.2d at 562, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 522. See infra part IV.D for a discussion
of the rationale underlying the court's treatment of coerced confessions as sui generis.
96. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d at 330, 405 P.2d at 562, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 522. See supra note 28
for a discussion of this provision.
97. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d at 330, 405 P.2d at 562, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 522. In Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), the defendant had also repeatedly confessed, but had done so
voluntarily. Id. at 190-91. While upholding the conviction, the Court remarked, in dicta, that
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significantly stronger incriminatory weight, the court concluded that

"'the

evidence

complained

of [did not]

contribute[]

to

the

conviction.' "'
Significantly, both Schader and Jacobson involved confessions obtained in violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
and not coerced confessions per se. While these decisions are important

in illustrating the foundation upon which the Cahill decision rests, this
axiomatic distinction is relevant throughout the remainder of this Note.
III.

A.

PEOPLE V.CAHILL

Statement of the Case

Mark Steven Cahill was convicted of one count of first degree murder with special circumstances, one count of robbery, one count of rape,
and several lesser offenses. 99 The prosecution declined to seek the death
penalty, however, and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole."°
On appeal, the court of appeal reversed all of Cahill's murder-re-

lated convictions. 01' The court determined that the defendant's confession had been elicited by the police officers' "implied promise of benefit

or leniency," thus rendering the confession involuntary and inadmissible
at trial.°

2

The court held that admitting the confession during the trial

0
required an automatic reversal of the murder-related convictions.

3

While the Attorney General's petition for review to the California
Supreme Court was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided
had the confessions been involuntary, a reversal would have been ordered because "the confession was a prominent feature of the trial." Id. at 190.
98. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d at 331, 405 P.2d at 563, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (quoting Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). The court stated that "[i]t is not plausible ... to
conclude that 10 statements were sufficiently more persuasive than only eight and that the
elimination of two would have altered the outcome." Id. Thus, the majority seemed to apply
a "totality of the circumstances" approach in which the court evaluated the two inadmissible
statements in relation to all of the evidence. See id. at 333, 405 P.2d at 564, 46 Cal. Rptr. at
524.
99. People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 483, 853 P.2d 1037, 1040, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 585
(1993).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court specifically found that the interrogating officers' factually inaccurate
statements concerning the legal definition of first degree murder-specifically felony murderhad improperly prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 483 & n.4, 853 P.2d at 1040-41 & n.4, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 585-86 & n.4.
103. Id. at 484, 853 P.2d at 1041, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
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Fulminante.'° The state high court granted review and then remanded
the matter back to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of
05
Fulminante.1
After reconsideration, the court of appeal again held that

the murder-related convictions required automatic reversal because the

trial court erroneously admitted the coerced confession.106 The court
grounded its decision in "the independent provisions of the California
Constitution and not solely on the federal constitutional decisions overruled in Fulminante."'1 7 Accordingly, the court reversed the murder-

related convictions without
considering whether the involuntary confes'0 8
sion was "harmless."'
The California Supreme Court again granted review, but limited it

to the issue of whether the California Constitution independently requires an automatic reversal when a trial court has improperly admitted
a defendant's coerced confession.' 0 9
B.

Majority Opinion

Writing for the majority, Justice George declared that the Fulminante decision provided the court with "an appropriate opportunity to
reconsider the validity of the reversible-per-se rule as a matter of Califor-

nia law."

0

The court believed that previous California cases applying

the reversible-per-se rule were consistent with the then-existing federal

standard.'' The court acknowledged that, although California had ini104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. Id. at 484-85, 853 P.2d at 1041, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586. Interestingly, the Cahill court
did not consider California's liberal Truth-in-Evidence provision, which states that "relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). The
court expressly declared that
[b]y its terms, the Truth-in-Evidence provision affects only the admissibility of evidence[;] ...[t]here is nothing in the Truth-in-Evidence provision that purports to
affect the standard for determining the prejudicialeffect, under state law, of the introduction at trial of evidence that remains inadmissible under California law.
Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 500, 853 P.2d at 1052, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597 (citations omitted).
110. People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 500, 853 P.2d 1037, 1052, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 597
(1993).
111. Id. The Supreme Court held in Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958), that
involuntary confessions require automatic reversal. It is interesting to note that People v.
Berve, 51 Cal. 2d 286, 332 P.2d 97 (1958), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853
P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993), was decided shortly thereafter. Thus, if the majority is
correct in assuming that California doctrine involving coerced confessions changed with Berve,
arguably the California high court abdicated its independence in the area of coerced confessions long ago.
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tially followed a reversible error standard of review after the enactment
of article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution,1 12 since 1958 the
1 13
court had strictly adhered to a reversible-per-se rule.
Justice George explained that neither the language nor the background of the constitutional provision supports treating coerced confes-

sions "uniquely, among evidentiary errors[,] as reversible per se." 1 14 The
majority then reasoned, in complete deference to Chief Justice Rehn-

quist's opinion in Fulminante, that a "miscarriage ofjustice" exists solely
within the realm of fundamental "structural defects," 11' 5 and never arises

in the context of "trial errors"'1 16 -such as coerced confessions. 1 1 7 Thus,
the court noted that if the error does not deny a criminal defendant the
constitutionally required "orderly legal process," 11' 8 there is no need to
"automatically and monolithically"
overturn the defendant's

conviction.1 19
The majority then examined the Jacobson case, concluding that the
Jacobson court's reasoning was not limited to its specific facts.120 Justice

George provided several examples in which he believed an erroneously
admitted confession would be harmless.12 1 The underlying rationale for

his conclusion was that there are certain cases in which a reviewing court
can examine the totality of the record and confidently hold that "there
[was] no reasonable probability that the exclusion of the confession
122
would have affected the result."'
Next, the court addressed the issue of "official misconduct," con-

cluding that in this context it is often less egregious than in the case of
112. See supra part II.B.1.
113. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 502, 853 P.2d at 1053-54, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598-99; see People v.
Berve, 51 Cal. 2d 286, 332 P.2d 97. For a discussion of Berve, see supra part II.B.2.a.
114. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 501, 853 P.2d at 1053, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
115. See infra part IV.B for a discussion of structural errors.
116. See infra part IV.B for a discussion of trial errors.
117. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 501-02, 853 P.2d at 1053, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
118. Id. at 502, 853 P.2d at 1054, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
119. Id. at 503, 853 P.2d at 1054, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
120. Id. at 505, 853 P.2d at 1056, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601. For a discussion of Jacobson, see
supra part II.B.2.e.
121. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 505, 853 P.2d at 1056, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 (citing Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 313-14 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Justice George gave
three examples:
(1) when the defendant was apprehended by the police in the course of committing
the crime, (2) when there are numerous, disinterested reliable eyewitnesses to the
crime whose testimony is confirmed by a wealth of uncontroverted physical evidence,
or (3) in a case in which the prosecution introduced, in addition to the confession, a
videotape of the commission of the crime.
Id.
122. Id.
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other constitutional violations.' 2 3 Additionally, the majority reiterated
its position that unlike the "old" federal reversible-per-se rule, which was
based on deterring illegal police conduct, California's automatic reversal
rule was founded on a fairness rationale.124 As Justice Cardozo said fairness does not require "the criminal ...to go free because the constable
has blundered."' 12 Furthermore, the majority reasoned that confessions
obtained through outrageously improper means will either not be offered
into evidence by the state, or will be ruled inadmissible by the trial
26
court. 1

In addressing the reliability of coerced confessions, Justice George
stated that "a confession, although inadmissible because obtained by unconstitutional means, is in fact reliable." 2 ' He noted that an appellate
court can properly evaluate the reliability of an involuntary confession
under the "traditional prejudicial-error analysis" and rule accordingly,
thus obviating the need for an automatic reversal. 128 Furthermore, a defendant can usually offer evidence of the coercive circumstances surrounding the confession in an attempt to rebut the confession's
129
reliability.
The majority subsequently held that stare decisis was inconclusive.'13 The court stated that prior to Fulminante, federal supremacy
commanded California to maintain a reversible-per-se rule; accordingly,
there was no occasion to review the California standard independently of
the federal minimum standard.'
Also, the majority believed that there
was no reason for the doctrinal departure that the court forged in 1958 in
People v. Berve 13 2 -the previously followed prejudicial-error standard
was quite sufficient.' 33 Finally, Justice George stated that strict adherence to a reversible-per-se rule would "have the detrimental effect of
123. Id. at 506, 853 P.2d at 1056, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601. For example, evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and improperly admitted at trial does not mandate
overturning a conviction. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970).
124. See Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 506, 853 P.2d at 1057, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
125. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y.) (containing Justice Cardozo's disparaging
characterization of exclusionary rule), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).

126. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 506, 853 P.2d at 1057, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
127. Id. at 507, 853 P.2d at 1057, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 508, 853 P.2d at 1058, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603.
131. Id. The court noted that it understood pre-Fulminante federal jurisprudence as requiring an automatic reversal where coerced confessions were improperly admitted at trial.
Id.
132. 51 Cal. 2d 286, 332 P.2d 97 (1958), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853
P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993).
133. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 508, 853 P.2d at 1058, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603.
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eroding the public's confidence in the criminal justice system."' 134 If
there was overwhelming evidence of guilt, reversal would simply result in
a "superfluous" second trial reaffirming guilt, or "even more unfortunately, in a [second] trial whose result35is [negatively affected] by the loss
1
of essential witnesses or testimony."'
Finally, the majority posited that a reversible-per-se rule would necessarily diminish other constitutional rights. An automatic reversal
without regard to other incriminating evidence would "generate pressure
to find that the [improper] police conduct was lawful after all and
constitutional standards of police conduct to avoid
thereby to undermine
136
retrial."'
needless
The court then explicitly adopted the People v. Watson 13 "reasonable-probability" test, 138 but stated that since this standard was less demanding than the federal harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard,
California would necessarily3 adopt the federal constitutional minimum
promulgated in Chapman.1
C. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Mosk
Welcome to the "Inquisition and the Star Chamber."'" Justice
Mosk's startling references to two unseemly historical practices underscored his sentiment concerning the majority opinion. He believed that
"there is no reason to abandon or even reconsider the well- and longsettled California rule... requir[ing] automatic reversal of any ensuing
judgment of conviction" for an improperly admitted involuntary confession.' 4 ' In essence, "a fundamental principle of justice has become a cas' 142
ualty of the synthetic war on crime.'
134. Id. at 509, 853 P.2d at 1058, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603.
135. Id.
136. Id., 853 P.2d at 1059, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (alteration in original) (citations omitted
in original).
137. 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956).
138. Id. at 836, 299 P.2d at 254; see supra note 40 for a discussion of this test.
139. See infra part IV.D.2.a for a discussion of this test.
140. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 512, 853 P.2d at 1060, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
dissenting).
141. Id. at 511, 853 P.2d at 1060, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
142. Id. (Mosk, J.,

1578

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1559

a. underlying rationalefor excluding coerced confessions at trial
Justice Mosk's lengthy dissent began by enumerating several policies
that militate against admitting coerced confessions into evidence. 143 One
such policy involves preventing governmental overreaching.'" Second,
coerced confessions are unreliable evidence and thus should not be ad-

missible at trial.' 45 Third, and most importantly, the legal system must

ensure fairness in the adversarial contest between the sovereign and the

individual. 146 Justice Mosk reasoned that the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system is more important than the outcome of any individual

criminal trial.147 As such, these three policies mandate a new trial where

a criminal defendant's conviction has been obtained by an improperly
admitted coerced confession; otherwise, the system's "legitimacy" is ir-

reparably tainted. 141

143. Justice Mosk first examined the underlying rationales for excluding coerced confessions at trial. Id. at 514-18, 853 P.2d at 1062-65, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607-10 (Mosk, J., dissenting). He then applied these rationales to support his contention that admission of a coerced
confession at trial necessitates automatic reversal of a conviction. Id. at 518, 523, 853 P.2d at
1065, 1068, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610, 613 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 517, 853 P.2d at 1063, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (holding rule's purpose is to deter police
conduct "revolting to the sense of justice"); People v. Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d 160, 170, 346 P.2d
764, 769 (1959) (noting that "exclusion serves to discourage the use of physical brutality"),
cert. granted, 362 U.S. 987 (1960), and cert. dismissed, 366 U.S. 207 (1961).
145. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 517, 853 P.2d at 1064, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d at 170, 346 P.2d at 769 (stating involuntary confessions are
inadmissible because "they are untrustworthy"); I LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 6.2(b),
at 440-41 (asserting defendants reach point whereby they wrongly confess to avoid further
harm).
146. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 517, 853 P.2d at 1064, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) ("The aim of the requirement of
due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the [government's] use of evidence [against the individual,] whether true or false.");
Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d at 170, 346 P.2d at 769 ("[It offends 'the community's sense of fair play
and decency' to convict a defendant by evidence extorted from him.") (citing People v. Berve,
51 Cal. 2d 286, 290, 332 P.2d 97, 99 (1958) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173
(1952))).
147. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 518, 853 P.2d at 1064, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
148. See id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk concluded that both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution would be violated by admitting coerced
confessions into evidence. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). California Constitutional due process
provisions would also be violated. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, §§ 7, 15.
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b. introduction of a coerced confession into evidence automatically
requires a new trial
i.

the United States Constitution

Justice Mosk first analyzed United States Supreme Court decisions
prior to Fulminante, which held that admission of a defendant's involuntary confession at trial required automatic reversal. 149 He concluded
that this rule was based on maintaining fairness between the government
and the defendant. 150 Thus, he wrote, "'[tihe harm caused by the violation-the skewed balance between the state and the accused-[can] be
cured [only] by a new trial at which the confession and its fruits are
excluded.' "151
Second, the justice opined that a coerced confession is fundamen-

tally distinguishable from any other type of evidence-it is sui generis
evidence: 52 Such a confession represents an "extrajudicial plea of
guilty. ,1 5 3 Thus, if a coerced guilty plea cannot sustain a conviction because it denies the defendant the due process rights guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment, 5 4 then neither can a coerced confession support a

conviction.

55

This conclusion is conceptually divorced from reliability

concerns. Justice Mosk stated that

"[iut is ...axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is
deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in
whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without re-

gard for the truth or falsity of the confession [citation], and
aside from the confession
even though there is ample1 evidence
56
to support the conviction."
149. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 518, 853 P.2d at 1065, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610 (Musk, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 n.6 (1986); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499, 508 n.6 (1983); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 23 (1967); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560 (1958); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945), Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 541 (1897).
150. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 519, 853 P.2d at 1065, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610 (Mask, J.,
dissenting).
dissenting) (quoting
151. Id. at 519, 853 P.2d at 1065, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610 (Mask, J.,
Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless ConstitutionalError,88 COLUM. L. REV.79,
104 (1988)).
152. Id. (Mask, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Mask, J., dissenting).
154. See supra note 7.
155. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 519-20, 853 P.2d at 1065, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610 (Mask, J.,
dissenting) (citing Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942)).
156. Id. at 520, 853 P.2d at 1065-66, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610-11 (Mask, J.,dissenting)
(quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964)).
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Justice Mosk then discussed the fundamental unfairness of not applying a reversible-per-se rule to coerced confessions. 157 In reference to
coerced confessions, Chapman itself held that "there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error."' 58 The justice further explained that a criminal trial's truth-seeking function should not impinge upon the United
States Constitution's implicit safeguards guaranteeing fairness to crimi159
nal defendants.
In addressing Fulminante, Justice Mosk accorded the decision little
precedential weight for two main reasons." 6 First, it was decided by the
narrowest of margins. 16 1 Second, he believed that the underlying distinc1 62
tion between trial errors and structural defects is untenable.
ii. the California Constitution
In the second part of his dissent, Justice Mosk began by stating that
coerced confessions "'constitute[ ] a denial of due process of law . ..
under the ...[California] Constitution [ ] . ..[and] offend the community's sense of fair play and decency.'" 163
157. Id. at 519, 853 P.2d at 1065, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
158. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967). Chapman cites Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), for the proposition that the use of a coerced confession at trial is
grounds for a new trial. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8 (citing Payne, 356 U.S. at 568). In
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), the Court criticized Payne.
159. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 522, 853 P.2d at 1067, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Such constitutional safeguards include the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
160. Id. at 545-46, 853 P.2d at 1083, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
161. See supra note 4. Justice Mosk noted that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was
"manifestly unnecessary to the court's judgment, [and therefore] dictum." Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th
at 546, 853 P.2d at 1083, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Further, Chief Justice
Rehnquist later conceded as much. See Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks at the
Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference 11 (June 28, 1991) (transcript available in Harvard Law
School Library).
162. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 547, 853 P.2d at 1084, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629 (Mosk, J., dissenting). This distinction is discussed further infra part IV.B.
163. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 523, 853 P.2d at 1068, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Berve, 51 Cal. 2d 286, 290, 332 P.2d 97, 99 (1958) (quoting Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952))). Justice Mosk also briefly discussed applicable California Penal Code provisions, stating that they supported a reversible-per-se rule in regard to
coerced confessions. Id. at 528, 853 P.2d at 1071, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). He stated that
[i]t
is undisputed, and indeed indisputable, that the privilege against self-incrimination, under both the United States and California Constitutions, is one of the most
"substantial" of "rights." Similarly, it is settled beyond peradventure that the admission of a coerced confession must at the very least "tend[ ] to [the defendant's] prejudice" in respect to this most "substantial right."
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The justice then examined the original purpose of article VI, section
13 of the California Constitution,' 4 concluding that it was aimed at
wealthy defendants.1 65 He arrived at this conclusion by analyzing legislative arguments surrounding section 13's adoption:
"The trial of a criminal is so hedged about with technicalities
that it has grown almost impossible to convict one whose
wealth is sufficient to enable him to employ counsel skilled in
the technique of criminal law. Thus there has grown up two
systems of law-one for the poor, the other for the rich. The
pauper prisoner is subjected to the iniquities of the 'third degree' to secure from him incriminating evidence, while the
wealthy one is surrounded by a corps of defenders, whose skill
in barricading their client behind technicalities is usually com166
mensurate with the fees secured."
Justice Mosk concluded that since Steven Mark Cahill was a "pauper
prisoner," he did not fit under the provision's targeted class of criminal
defendants-the wealthy.' 67
Finally, Justice Mosk stated that principles of stare decisis controlled this case and no principled reason existed to blatantly disregard
the "long-settled California rule of automatic reversal for the admission
1 68
of a coerced confession."
2.

Justice Kennard

Justice Kennard's relatively short dissent focused on both doctrinal
as well as practical reasons for disavowing the harmless-error standard.
She stated that coerced confessions are inherently "irreconcilable with
the Anglo-American system of justice." '6 9 Accordingly, their improper
170
admission automatically necessitates a new trial.
The justice propounded several rationales to support her position.
First, the doctrine of stare decisis commanded the court to adhere to the
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1258, 1404 (West 1982)). Since this
Note is primarily concerned with constitutional as opposed to statutory issues, no further references will be made to applicable statutory provisions.
164. See supra note 28 (discussing CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13).
165. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 532-33, 853 P.2d at 1074, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
166. Id. at 532, 853 P.2d at 1074, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting
A.E. BOYNTON, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (1911)).
167. Id. at 533, 853 P.2d at 1074, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 554, 853 P.2d at 1089, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
169. Id. (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
170. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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existing reversible-per-se rule.' 7 1 Second, automatic reversal "[wa]s a
simple bright-line rule that conserve[d] appellate resources." 172 Third, a
reversible-per-se rule sent a clear message to law enforcement personnel
that constitutional violations in this area were indefensible.' 73 Finally,
an automatic reversal standard was the only standard that "g[ave] sufficient weight to the primal constitutional interest at stake." 174 In short,
Justice Kennard believed that fundamental notions of fairness and "respect for the individual" mandated a reversible-per-se rule. 175

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Stare Decisis

1. Introduction
[I]n a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have
so covered the ground that they fix the point of departure from
which the labor of the judge begins. Almost invariably, his first
step is to examine and compare them. If they are plain and to
the point, there may be need of nothing more. Stare decisis is at
76
least the everyday working rule of our law.'
Stare decisis serves several important functions including
"promot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development
of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."' 17 7 Accordingly, departures from precedent are warranted where
there is a subsequent change in the law, new facts and experiences warrant the change, or precedent has become an impediment to consistent
adjudication.'
Absent these or other compelling rationales, precedent
171. Id. at 557, 853 P.2d at 1091, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 558, 853 P.2d at 1092, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 559, 853 P.2d at 1092, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Thus, the harmless-error "safety net" cannot save convictions grounded in coerced
confessions.
174. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
175. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
176. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19-20 (1921).
This Note will present a brief overview of stare decisis to illustrate the principle's great importance in Anglo-American jurisprudence. An in-depth analysis of stare decisis is beyond the
scope of this Note; however, for a thorough discussion of stare decisis, see HONORABLE EDWARD D. RE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STARE DECISiS (1975); Note, Constitutional Stare
Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1344 (1990).
177. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 265-66 (1986)).
178. See id. at 2621-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

June 1994]

"'HARMLESS" EVIDENTIAR Y BOMBSHELLS

1583

must be followed if the judicial system is to maintain its sense of
179
legitimacy.
2.

Stare decisis abandoned in Cahill

a. inadequate grounds even to reconsiderexisting California law
The Cahill decision represents an unprincipled departure from precedent. The majority stated that "the Fulminante decision... provide[s]
us with an appropriate opportunity to reconsider the validity of the reversible-per-se rule as a matter of California law." 18 Why? If California
" ' a change
law is independent of federal law as the majority professed, 18
in the latter cannot rationally be considered a proper justification for reconsidering California doctrine. 82 In other words, the California
Supreme Court "should disabuse itself of the notion that in matters of
constitutional law and criminal procedure we must always play Ginger
Rogers to the high court's Fred Astaire-always following, never
leading."' 8 3
The majority anticipated this argument, but offered an unconvincing
rebuttal. The court contended that while previous California decisions
were independently grounded in California law, they were not decided
"in the face of a contrary federal harmless error rule, but rather embraced that rule on the understanding that such a rule was consistent
with the governing federal rule."' 84
The majority's proffered rationale suffers from two major flaws.
First, states are free to enact legislation that affords criminal defendants
greater protections than the minimum guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.' 85 Thus, even if federal law subjected coerced confessions
to the less stringent harmless-error standard, states could still afford
179. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2815-17 (1992) (maintaining
central holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1971), which constitutionally protected women's right to choose to have abortion).
180. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 500, 853 P.2d at 1052, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
181. See id.
182. This is especially true if, as the majority maintains, federal law and California law had
differing purposes for the old reversible-per-se rule-the federal rule was grounded in deterring
police abuse, while the California rule was based on fairness. Id. at 497, 853 P.2d at 1050, 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
183. Id. at 557-58, 853 P.2d at 1091, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636 (Kennard, J., dissenting). In
support of this premise, see FRIESEN, supra note 13.
184. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 500, 853 P.2d at 1052, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
185. See supra note 13. In Chapman Justice Harlan noted that "[t]he [United States
Supreme] Court has no power.., to declare which of many admittedly constitutional alternatives a State may choose" in fashioning safeguards for criminal defendants. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 48 (1967) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
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criminal defendants the more protective reversible-per-se rule. Second,
unlike the United States Constitution, the California Constitution has an
express provision, the "miscarriage of justice" standard, which addresses
reversible errors.186 In People v. Brommel,187 the California Supreme
Court held this provision automatically invalidated a conviction where a
coerced confession was improperly introduced into evidence. 88 Thus,
there was no principled reason to even reconsider existing California law.
b. over 100 years of precedent extinguished
i.

decisions prior to 1911

The majority begins its analysis of relevant precedent by examining
the 1911 enactment of article VI, section 13-the miscarriage of justice
standard. 189 The court believes that decisions predating the provision are
wholly inconsequential in determining whether a coerced confession justifies automatic reversal. 90
The court's reasoning in refusing to take notice of decisions prior to
1911 is flawed. The miscarriage of justice standard, and its "cousin,"
harmless-error, are both founded on the premise that other, overwhelming evidence of guilt can render an improperly admitted coerced confession nonprejudicial or harmless.1 91 Justice Mosk correctly noted that
pre-1911 decisions involving coerced confessions adhered to a reversibleper-se rule 192 and "came to full stature [ ] within a jurisprudence requiring harmless-error analysis" for other types of errors.1 93 Specifically, in
People v. Brotherton,'9 4 the court declared that "[o]ur judgment.., is to
be given 'without regard to technical error or defect which does not affect
186. See supra note 28; supra part II.B.I.
187. 56 Cal. 2d 629, 364 P.2d 845, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961).
188. Id. at 634, 364 P.2d at 848, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
189. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 494, 853 P.2d at 1047-48, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592-93.
190. See id. The court states that
[decisions] prior to the enactment of the California constitutional provision presently
governing reversible error-shed no light upon the question whether the admission
of an involuntary confession amounts to a "miscarriage of justice" under article VI,
section 13, so as to compel reversal without regard to the other evidence received at
trial.
Id. at 494 n.10, 853 P.2d at 1047-48 n.10, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592-93 n.10.
191. Id. at 509-10, 853 P.2d at 1058-59, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603-04.
192. See id. at 524, 853 P.2d at 1069, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The
justice cited several cases supporting his assertion: People v. Barric, 49 Cal. 342, 345 (1874);
People v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 452, 455 (1871); and People v. Ah How, 34 Cal. 218, 223-24 (1867).
Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 524, 853 P.2d at 1069, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
193. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 524, 853 P.2d at 1069, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
194. 47 Cal. 388 (1874).
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the substantial rights of the parties.'.. . The prisoners must go further,
and affirmatively show in some way that their substantial rights have
'
been injuriously affected by the error complained of."195
Also, prior to 1911, the court had employed a harmless-error rule in
numerous contexts including pleading errors, 196 procedural errors, 197 instruction errors, 19 and evidentiary errors.' 99 Pre-1911 cases are important because they illustrate that while most
errors were subjected to harmless-error analysis, coerced confessions
were considered sui generis evidence-their improper admission automatically warranted overturning a conviction. Thus, the majority's fervent insistence upon looking solely at post-1911 decisions ignores stare
decisis principles.
ii.

decisions from 1911 to 1958

Article VI, section 13 was interpreted soon after enactment in People v. O'Bryan.2° The O'Bryan court held that
[s]ection 4 1/2 of article VI of our constitution must be given at
least the effect of abrogating the old rule that prejudice is presumed from any error of law. Where error is shown it is the
duty of the court to examine the evidence and ascertain from
such examination whether the error did or did not in fact work
any injury. The mere fact of error does not make out a prima
facie case for reversal which must be overcome by a clear showing that no injury could have resulted.2"'
The Cahill majority seized upon this language and rooted its holding in O'Bryan.2° 2 One "slight" problem arises with the majority's passionate adherence to O'Bryan-O'Bryan did not involve a coerced
confession! 20 3 Instead, O'Bryan dealt with an improperly admitted dec195. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
196. See, e.g., People v. Mead, 145 Cal. 500, 502-04, 78 P. 1047, 1049 (1904); People v.
Haagen, 139 Cal. 115, 116-17, 72 P. 836, 837 (1903); People v. Wynn, 133 Cal. 72, 73, 65 P.
126, 126-27 (1901).
197. See, e.g., People v. Dolan, 96 Cal. 315, 318-19, 31 P. 107, 108-09 (1892); People v.
Smalling, 94 Cal. 112, 119-20, 29 P. 421, 423 (1892); People v. O'Brien, 88 Cal. 483, 488-89, 26
P. 362, 364 (1891).
198. See, e.g., People v. Bums, 63 Cal. 614, 615 (1883); People v. Nelson, 56 Cal. 77, 81-83
(1880).
199. See, e.g., People v. Greening, 102 Cal. 384, 386-87, 36 P. 665, 666 (1894); People v.
Nelson, 85 Cal. 421, 425-29, 24 P. 1006, 1007-08 (1890).
200. 165 Cal. 55, 130 P. 1042 (1913). For a discussion of O'Bryan, see supra part II.B.1.
201. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. at 65, 130 P. at 1046 (first emphasis added).
202. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 488-92, 853 P.2d at 1043-47, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588-92.
203. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. at 61, 130 P. at 1044.
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laration against interest. 2 4 Further, there was no majority opinion; 20 5 as
Justice Mosk correctly points out, the case was decided by a lead opinion
and a concurring opinion. 20 6 Accordingly, the precedential value accorded O'Bryan must necessarily be diminished.
Notwithstanding these minor obstacles, the majority used O'Bryan
as a starting point to offer ten cases purportedly validating a harmlesserror analysis for involuntary confessions.2 "7 However, Justice Mosk
pointed out that four of the cases cited do not directly address the issue
whether an improperly admitted coerced confession mandates an automatic reversal.20 8
For example, three of the cases "did not even consider whether to
apply [the] rule of automatic reversal because [the court] did not find any
confession to have been coerced. ' 20 9 In the fourth case, the court simply
applied the Federal Constitution's rule of automatic reversal; it did not
ie
case cited
consider the California constitutional provision. 210 In another cs
by the majority, the United States Supreme Court expressly overturned
the court's assertion that a coerced confession "could not have affected
204. Id. See supra note 38 discussing the distinction between coerced confessions and declarations against interest.
205. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. at 68, 130 P. at 1047.
206. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th'at 528, 853 P.2d at 1071, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Sloss authored the lead opinion, in which Justices Angellotti and Shaw joined.
O'Bryan, 165 Cal. at 68, 130 P. at 1047. Justice Lorigan authored an opinion concurring in
the judgment, in which Justices Melvin and Henshaw joined. Id. at 70, 130 P. at 1048.
207. The ten cases cited are People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 623-24, 226 P.2d 330, 336
(1951), afl'd sub nom. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); People v. Gonzales, 24 Cal.
2d 870, 877-78, 151 P.2d 251, 254 (1944); People v. Jones, 24 Cal. 2d 601, 604, 150 P.2d 801,
804-05 (1944); People v. Rogers, 22 Cal. 2d 787, 803-07, 141 P.2d 722, 730-32 (1943); People
v. Ferdinand, 194 Cal. 555, 565-70, 229 P. 341, 345-46 (1924); People v. Sourisseau, 62 Cal.
App. 2d 917, 930-31, 145 P.2d 916, 923 (1944); People v. Mellus, 134 Cal. App. 219, 220-26,
25 P.2d 237, 238-40 (1933); People v. Day, 125 Cal. App. 106, 110-11, 13 P.2d 855, 856-57
(1932); People v. Dye, 119 Cal. App. 262, 271-73, 6 P.2d 313, 316-17 (1931); and People v.
Reed, 68 Cal. App. 19, 20, 228 P. 361, 361-62 (1924). Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 494, 853 P.2d at
1048, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593.
208. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 542, 853 P.2d at 1081, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
209. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk is referring to Gonzales, 24 Cal. 2d at 877-78,
151 P.2d at 254-55 (holding harmless erroneous refusal of instruction that jury should determine voluntariness of confession); Rogers, 22 Cal. 2d at 806-08, 141 P.2d at 731-32 (noting
defendant did not challenge admissibility of confessions on grounds requiring determination of
voluntariness); and Ferdinand, 194 Cal. at 565-70, 229 P. at 345-46 (holding harmless erroneous refusal to permit defense counsel to voir dire witness regarding circumstances of
confession).
210. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 542, 853 P.2d at 1081, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk is referring to Jones, 24 Cal. 2d at 611, 150 P.2d at 806 (holding United
States Constitution bars conviction based on coerced confession).
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the fairness of defendant's trial."21' 1 Thus, while the majority's view regarding the treatment of coerced confessions during this time frame is
not meritless, it is by no means absolutely convincing.2 12
iii.

decisions from 1958 to Cahill

The Cahill majority acknowledged that California bad followed a
reversible-per-se rule since 1958,213 when the court decided People v.
Berve.2" 4 Further, the Cahill court specifically pointed out that "a reversible-per-se rule applied to the erroneous admission of confessions as a
matter of state law [is] independent of any federal compulsion."2 15 This
statement severely undermines the majority's proferred impetus for initially reconsidering its treatment of coerced confessions-the United
States Supreme Court's Fulminante decision.2 16 If the Cahill majority
truly believed California law is independent of the United States Supreme
Court in this area, it would not have so prominently focused and relied
upon Fulminante as the "torch-bearer" that illuminated a more enlightened pathway to justice.
One final point must be reiterated concerning the majority's complete disregard for stare decisis. The late Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall pronounced three rationales for a principled departure from precedent: (1) where there is a subsequent change in the law;
(2) when new facts and experiences warrant the change; or (3) when precedent has become an impediment to consistent adjudication.2 1 7 Absent
these or any other compelling reasons, a major change in jurisprudence
arguably cannot be considered principled.
211. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 543, 853 P.2d at 1081, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 623, 226 P.2d 330, 336 (1951), affid sub nom.
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952)).
212. In fairness to the majority, five of the cited cases applied harmless-error review. See
People v. Sourisseau, 62 Cal. App. 2d 917, 930-31, 145 P.2d 916, 923 (1944); People v. Mellus,
134 Cal. App. 219, 220-26, 25 P.2d 237, 238-40 (1933); People v. Day, 125 Cal. App. 106,
110-11, 13 P.2d 855, 856-57 (1932); People v. Dye, 119 Cal. App. 262, 271-73, 6 P.2d 313,
316-17 (1931); People v. Reed, 68 Cal. App. 19, 20, 228 P. 361, 361-62 (1924).
213. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 502, 853 P.2d at 1053-54, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598-99. See supra
part II.B.2 for a discussion of post-1958 cases.
214. 51 Cal. 2d 286, 332 P.2d 97 (1958), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853
P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993). See supra part II.B.2.a for a full discussion of this
case.
215. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 496, 853 P.2d at 1049, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594.
216. Id. at 500, 853 P.2d at 1052, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597. See supra part IV.A.2.a for a
discussion of this paradox.
217. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2621-22 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This
federal "generic" test is equally applicable to state law since it is not founded on federal law
principles.
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In support of the majority's holding, there was a subsequent change
in the law-the Fulminante decision.2 18 However, there is a problem
with the Cahill court's reliance on this change: It occurred in a separate
and independent judicial system from which the majority has declared
independence!2 19 Since the majority failed to mention any subsequent
changes in California law warranting a doctrinal departure from precedent, the majority did not meet this first criterion.
The majority also failed to mention any new facts or experiences in
support of their doctrinal change. Rather, the court merely mentioned
long-standing arguments according harmless-error treatment to coerced
confessions.2 2 °
Finally, precedent has not become an impediment to consistent adjudication in this area. Nothing could be more consistent than a brightline rule granting an automatic new trial for an improperly admitted involuntary confession. 2 2' In sum, using Justice Marshall's criteria as a
framework for analysis, Cahill represents an unprincipled departure
from stare decisis.
B.

Trial Versus Structural Errors
1. Introduction

The Cahill majority adopted Fulminante's fundamental distinction
between trial and structural errors. 22 2 Trial errors are those that occur
"during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore
be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in
order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 22 3 In Fulminante, coerced confessions were lumped into
the morass of existing trial errors.22 4 It is important to note that Chief
218. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
219. See Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 496, 853 P.2d at 1049, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594.
220. See supra part III.B.
221. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 167 (arguing bright-line rule of automatic reversal preferable where coerced confession improperly admitted at trial).
222. See Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 502, 853 P.2d at 1053-54, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598-99.
223. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.
224. Id. at 310. See supra note 3 for a listing of trial errors. Interestingly, at least one postFulminante court has treated a coerced confession as structural error. See Iowa v. Quintero,
No. 90-44, 1991 WL 207111, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1991), affid on othergrounds, 480
N.W.2d 50, 51 (Iowa 1992). The court specifically mentioned it was "unable to make the
distinction under the Iowa Constitution and case law between a coerced confession and other
'structural errors.'" Id. Accordingly, the court held that use of involuntary confessions warranted the automatic reversal of a conviction. Id. The court cited several cases supporting its
holding. Id. (citing, for example, State v. Rhiner, 352 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Iowa 1984); State v.
Hrbek, 336 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Iowa 1983)). However, all of them were pre-Fulminante. See

June 1994]

1589

"HARMLESS" E VIDENTIAR Y BOMBSHELLS

Justice Rehnquist is primarily concerned with factual accuracy, and thus
allowing supposedly reliable, "harmless," involuntary confessions into
evidence achieves his goal.22 5
Structural errors, on the other hand, occur when the "entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected."2'26 Because

of their all-encompassing effect on the trial, structural errors, which are
rare, are not accorded harmless-error treatment.2 2 7

2. Trial versus structural distinction is specious
Various scholars and jurists have attacked the trial versus structural
distinction as specious. For example, Professor Ogletree denounced the
distinction as unpersuasive 22 8 and wholly lacking in precedential support.229 Former United States Supreme Court Justice Byron White

termed the distinction a "meaningless dichotomy.

,230

California

Supreme Court Justice Mosk noted the distinction "simply does not
work" because Chief Justice Rehnquist never fully articulated the "structure" of structural errors.23 1 Finally, one writer has suggested that the
dichotomy "has no historical justification except to widen the reach of
' 23 2
the harmless error analysis to even more constitutional errors.
In Fulminante, Chief Justice Rehnquist enumerated several examples of structural errors: 23 3 denial of the accused's right to counsel at
id. In any event, it remains to be seen which states, if any, will follow Iowa's lead and con-

clude that coerced confessions are structural errors.
225. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308. Justice Rehnquist states "'that the central purpose of a

criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence.'"

Id.

(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). But see infra part IV.C for a

discussion that fairness to criminal defendants may sometimes outweigh the quest for truth.
226. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10. See infra notes 234-38 for examples of structural
errors.
227. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
228. Ogletree, supra note 4, at 161-62.
229. Id. at 164 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 288-90 (White, J., dissenting)).
230. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 290 (White, J., dissenting).
231. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 548, 853 P.2d at 1084-85, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629-30 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
232. John M. McCarthy, Note, For the Sake of JudicialEconomy-Supreme Court Rules
Coerced Confession Can Be Harmless Error. Fulminante v. Arizona, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991),
17 S.ILL. U. L.J. 621, 635 (1993); see also Steven H. Goldberg, HarmlessError: Constitutional
Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 427 (1980) (maintaining harmless error

doctrine "has no substantive doctrinal base"); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 151, at 80-81 (arguing Supreme Court's promotion of factual accuracy "denigrates important constitutional protections accorded criminal suspects").
233. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10.
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trial,2 34 trial before a judge who is not impartial,2 3 unlawful exclusion of
members of the defendant's race from a grand jury,23 6 denial of the right
to self-representation at trial,2 37 and denial of the right to public trial.2 38
A comparison of the aforementioned structural errors with both
current case law and common sense proves the distinction between trial
and structural errors is untenable. In Rushen v. Spain,239 the United
States Supreme Court held that denial of the defendant's right to be present at trial warranted harmless-error review. 24 Professor Ogletree forcefully stated that "[iut strains credulity to assert that the denial of a
defendant's right to be present at all stages of the trial is a mere trial
error, whereas the denial of a defendant's right to self-representation at

trial is 'structural.' ,241
In Sullivan v. Louisiana,2 4 2 the Court held a deficient reasonabledoubt instruction to be a structural error requiring automatic reversal.24 3
Such an error appears to be a "classic" trial error, and should probably
have been classified as such if the Court were truly consistent in its classification scheme. 2" In this same vein, a failure to instruct the jury on the
prosecution's burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would
also appear to be a trial-type error. 245 However, it too is considered a
structural error.2 46
Finally, there appears to be no specific reason to classify a violation
of the right to a public trial as a structural error. Justice White stated as
much when he wrote that a "violation of the guarantee of a public trial
require[s] reversal without any showing of prejudice.., even though the
values of a public trial may be intangible and unprovable in any particular case."' 24 7 In other words, the factual accuracy of a trial will usually
234. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
235. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
236. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
237. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
238. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
239. 464 U.S. 114 (1983).
240. Id. at 117-18 & n.2.
241. Ogletree, supra note 4, at 164 (citation omitted).
242. 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
243. Id. at 2083. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate concurrence attempting to justify his classification of this error as structural. See id. at 2083-84 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). His attempt was not persuasive.
244. See supra part IV.B.1 for a discussion of the trial-structural error distinction.
245. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 163.
246. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 & n.14 (1979).
247. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 294-95 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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not be impaired by this type of violation. As such, there appears to be no
reason to apply a "prophylactic" approach 248 to such an error.
C. FairnessIssues
The Cahill majority presented a somewhat novel approach to buttress its argument subjecting coerced confessions to the harmless-error
standard-fairness to the public.24 9 The majority contended that public
confidence as well as respect for "the law" would erode if overwhelming
evidence of guilt is ignored because of a potentially immaterial involuntary confession. 250 Further, the Cahill court posited that the public is
unfairly burdened by the increased costs of "a superfluous retrial in
which the outcome is a foregone conclusion. '2 51 Those two arguments
are reasonable and thoughtful, especially in light of the ever-increasing
demands placed upon our judicial system.
However, fairness is a two-way street and constitutional guarantees
are designed to protect the rights of the defendant, not the government.25 2 Additionally, the accused's resources for his or her defense
seem inconsequential when compared to the government's vast array of
resources. Consequently, our criminal justice system is accusatorial, not
inquisitorial,2 5 3 which means the government must use its largesse to
gather enough independent evidence to convict the accused 254 -- it may
not force an accused to assist in his or her own prosecution.25 5
248. See Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 503, 853 P.2d at 1054, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599 (discussing
former prophylactic treatment of coerced confessions).
249. Id. at 509, 853 P.2d at 1058, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603.
250. Id. The majority also notes that a reversal could unfairly burden the public's interest
in seeing the "guilty" properly punished because of the unavailability of key witnesses or other
evidence at the second trial. Id.
251. Id. But see Ogletree, supra note 4, at 167 (suggesting that costs of harmless-error
review may actually exceed costs of new trial).
252. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970). In criminal prosecutions the
government represents the public's interest; accordingly, this Note uses the terms "public" and
"government" interchangeably.
253. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
254. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 516, 853 P.2d at 1063, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 1.6(b) (stating accusatorial system is underlying principle of criminal justice system).
255. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965); 1
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 1.6(b); Aronson, supra note 4, at 591. See generally Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory SelfIncriminationand the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part1), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (1992) (analyzing historical interrelationship between coerced confessions and right against selfincrimination).
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The Cahill court further reasoned that coerced confessions may
often be reliable.2 5 6 Even if this were true,2 57 the value in protecting an
individual's constitutional procedural rights may outweigh the truthseeking function. 258 As Justice Frankfurter said nearly fifty years ago,
"[t]he history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history
of procedure. ' 25 9 The automatic reversal rule for involuntary confessions originally stemmed from a necessity to curb abusive police procedures. 2 1 Although the police are entrusted with preserving peace and
protecting the citizenry, they must always be cognizant of their duty to
obey the law in their official pursuits. 26 1 They cannot "wring out confessions" in the pursuit of criminal justice.262 Otherwise, our system of ascertaining truth and meting out justice would be predicated on a
barbaric, quasi-Darwinian system in which brute force determined our
personal freedom. 263 In sum, the two countervailing forces-fairess to
the public and fairness to the accused-continue to produce conflicting
views. 264
256. See Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 507, 853 P.2d at 1057, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
257. This contention has been attacked by several authorities. See, e.g., 1 KENNETH S.
BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 118, at 432 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992); 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 6.2(b), at 442-44; Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv. 411, 414 (1954).
258. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 170. In Fulminante, Justice White articulated this premise as follows: "The search for truth is indeed central to our system of justice, but 'certain
constitutional rights are not, and should not be, subject to harmless-error analysis because
those rights protect important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the
trial.'" Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 587 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
259. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
260. See, eg., Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession?, 17 RUTGERS L. REV.
728, 739-41 (1963) (maintaining reversible-per-se rule deters improper police conduct); Ogletree, supra note 4, at 168-69 (declaring some constitutional errors so extreme that society
cannot tolerate conviction based on them).
261. See Aronson, supra note 4, at 596.
262. Id.
263. In his sardonic essay, Professor Freedman suggests that by the year 2050, "[t]he tone
and the essence of professionalism.., will be set by Rambo judges." Monroe Freedman, Law
in the 21st Century, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 503, 503 (1991). Further, he postulates that
"[c]oerced confessions will be well regarded by prosecuting authorities." Id. at 505. He concludes his essay by stating, "[i]n short, nothing is going to change in the next 59 years." Id.
264. See Aronson, supra note 4, at 603 (suggesting Fulminante adversely tilted scale in
favor of affirming convictions rather than safeguarding petitioners' constitutional rights).
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D. Coerced Confessions as Sui Generis Evidence
1. Traditional legal analysis
Writing for the Cahill majority, Justice George followed Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Fulminante2 6 5 and stated that a coerced confession's devastating impact does not justify a reversible-per-se rule.266
Rather, the improper admission of an involuntary confession into evidence is simply more likely to be deemed prejudicial than are other errors.26 7 The court believed traditional harmless-error analysis was
sufficient to safeguard the accused's constitutional rights; accordingly,
the monolithic, prophylactic, reversible-per-se rule was unnecessary.2 68
In sum, the majority believed there was no reason to treat coerced confessions any differently than other "trial" errors.26 9
The Cahill majority's view by no means represents an absolute consensus within the legal community. In Fulminante, Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion stated that a confession may have an
indelible impact ... on the trier of fact, as distinguished, for
instance, from the impact of an isolated statement that incriminates the defendant only when connected with other evidence.
If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted the crime, it
doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on that evidence
alone, without careful consideration of the other evidence in the
case.

27 0

Professor Ogletree insists that a coerced confession's "overwhelming"
prejudicial effect on a jury is nondeterminative and thus unsusceptible to
harmless-error review.27 1
Moreover, he asserts that the admission of a coerced confession distorts the trial process by altering the defense counsel's entire strategy. 7 2
Normally, an attorney can challenge improperly admitted incriminating
265. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
266. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 503, 853 P.2d at 1054, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
267. Id.
268. See id.
269. Id.
270. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Mosk made special
reference to this language in his argument in favor of treating coerced confessions as sui
generis evidence. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 552-53, 853 P.2d at 1088, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Further, Justice White, who echoed Justice Kennedy's view, argued
that "a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of the crime
may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision." Fulminante, 499
U.S. at 296 (White, J., dissenting).
271. Ogletree, supra note 4, at 165.
272. Id. at 166.
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evidence, such as fingerprints, through "traditional" trial methods like
cross-examination, chain-of-control questions, and probability of mistake
arguments.2 7 3 These defense tactics become wholly impracticable when
the improperly admitted evidence is a coerced confession.2 74 In such
cases, a defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right against self-incrimination is jettisoned away-since once admitted, a confession is not easily
forgotten.2 7 5 Coerced confessions, the "evidentiary bombshells ' 2 76 that
shatter defenses, thus necessitate special treatment. Confessions are unlike any other evidentiary creature; their impact is unparalleled. Accordingly, the only effective medicine for a trial infected with a coerced
confession is a new trial.2 77
2.

The science of psychology and coerced confessions
a. harmless-errorstandard of review

The Cahill court specifically pronounced that California would now
subject coerced confessions to harmless-error review. 278 The harmlesserror standard of review, originally promulgated in Chapman v. California,279 required the prosecution to show "beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. 280
This somewhat vague language regarding an appellate court's standard
of review was recently reinterpreted in Sullivan v. Louisiana.28 ' The
Court announced the appropriate inquiry on review "isnot whether, in a
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the error. ' ' 28 2 In other words, an appel273. See id. at 165-66 (discussing ways to challenge improperly admitted eyewitness

testimony).
274. Id at 166 (noting that jurors rarely disregard involuntary confession even when other
evidence may raise reasonable doubt of guilt).
275. Id ; see also infra part IV.D.2.c (discussing indelible imprint of coerced confessions on

jury).
276. People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 731, 401 P.2d 665, 674, 44 Cal. Rptr 193, 202
(1965), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582
(1993).
277. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 165-67; Stacy & Dayton, supra note 151, at 102-04;
Aronson, supra note 4, at 591. But see Sara E. Welch, Fifth Amendment-Harmless Error
Analysis Applied to Coerced Confessions, 82 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 849, 869-70 (1992)

(arguing that all constitutional errors should be subjected to harmless-error review because it is
not judge's province to hierarchically rank errors).
278. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 509-10, 853 P.2d at 1059, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604.
279. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
280. Id. at 24.
281. 113 S.Ct. 2078 (1993).
282. Id at 2081.
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late court cannot simply look at the other evidence in isolation, but
rather must examine all the evidence, including the coerced confession

and its devastating impact on the jury, in reaching its conclusion.
b.

the "averagejury" and appellate review

Sullivan commands a reviewing court to assume an intellectual omniscience in attempting to determine the involuntary confession's impact
on an "average jury."2'8 3 As with other errors subjected to the harmless-

error standard of review, coerced confessions are analyzed not by a repcommunity, but rather by a judicial triburesentative cross section of the
284

nal reading a "cold record.

This distinction is important for several reasons. First, the "average
jury" has been regarded as a "fictional character, whose attitudes are
ultimately supplied by the appellate court."28' 5 Consequently, there is no
such thing as an "average jury" and decisions rendered by an appellate

court merely represent the judges' best guess as to a typical jury's decision-making process.2 86 Such review is extremely improvidential in the
case of coerced confessions because unlike other evidence, "incriminating
statements from [the] defendant's own tongue are most persuasive evidence of his guilt, and the part they play in securing a conviction cannot
be determined. 28 7
Second, and related to the above discussion, is the appellate court's

"brute usurpation" of the jury's fact-finding role.288 Since coerced con-

fessions are arguably the most damaging form of evidence,28 9 the jury's

283. See id.
284. For a general discussion of appellate judges' biases interfering with their duty to neutrally adjudicate cases, see Francis A. Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet
Jungle: Criminal Justice in the Courts of Review, 70 IOWA L. REV. 311 (1985).
285. Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the PrejudicialEffect of Evidence: Can Judges
Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147, 1185. Teitelbaum further asserts that "judges can[not] accurately assess the prejudice created by an item of
proof." Id. at 1197.
286. For a comprehensive review of the jury decision-making process, see, for example,
Thomas M. Ostrom et al., An Integration Theory Analysis of Jurors'Presumptions of Guilt or
Innocence, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 436 (1978).
287. People v. Matteson, 61 Cal. 2d 466, 470, 393 P.2d 161, 163, 39 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1964)
(emphasis added), overruled by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d 582 (1993).
288. Ogletree, supra note 4, at 167; see also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(a), at 257 (1984) (discussing English courts' Exchequer Rule,
which presumed most trial errors caused prejudice warranting a new trial, thus ensuring appellate courts could not encroach upon jury's fact-finding function).
289. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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initial fact-finding process is almost meaningless.2 90 Thus, the reviewing
court is passing judgment based on an inherently prejudicial trial record.
The resulting inequity surrounding the review of a skewed trial record
cannot be overstated: One writer has suggested that "even if the appellate judges think the coerced confession should have been excluded, they
will rule the admission harmless if they think the defendant is really
29 1
guilty.

'

Harmless-error review imposes a daunting task upon our appellate
courts. It not only requires judges to completely ignore their own
preconceived notions of guilt or innocence, but also commands them to
delve into the minds of average jurors and divinely ascertain their methods of decision making.2 92 The above arguments suggest this is nearly
impossible when the error is a coerced confession.
c.

indelible imprint of coerced confession on jury

Not surprisingly, the rationales counseling against appellate review
of coerced confessions also apply in the context of juror decision making.
For example, psychological research suggests antidefendant individuals
more readily abandon their presumption of innocence when incriminating evidence is presented than prodefendant subjects.2 93 Assume for the
point of argument that a twelve-member jury has an equal distribution of
anti- and prodefendant members. Although a defendant is plainly
prejudiced by the improper introduction of a coerced confession, or other
improperly admitted evidence, this research implies that the extent of the
harm may be greater than expected.29 4 Fifty percent of the jury will
290. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 167.
291. Aronson, supra note 4, at 602 (citing Harmless Error,252 THE NATION 471 (1991));
see also Allen, supra note 284, at 332 (suggesting common thread in most appellate opinions
affirming criminal convictions is "a staunch belief.., in the guilt of the appellants"). Psychological literature also supports the view that appellate judges, like everyone else, have a natural
predisposition to seize upon negative, or incriminating, evidence. See Craig A. Anderson et
al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited
Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1037, 1047 (1980) (suggesting that belief
perseverance is enhanced when subject must explain proffered evidence); Willard L. Brigner &
Joyce G. Crouch, Is PerceptualSet Negatively Biased?, PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS, Aug.
1985, at 81, 82 (discussing observers' tendency to choose "ugly" portraits as most like "true"
picture, thereby implying negative effect has greater weight than positive effect in influencing
perception); Charles G. Lord et al., BiasedAssimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects
of PriorTheories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
2098, 2098 (1979) (maintaining people are more likely to accept evidence confirming their
preconceived beliefs).
292. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993).
293. Ostrom et al., supra note 286, at 446.
294. Id.
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quickly change their existing opinion to one favoring guilt.295 In essence,
a coerced confession provides a golden opportunity for jurors who are
looking for a reason to convict.
Further, since coerced confessions are arguably sui generis evidence,2 96 they will have an almost immeasurable impact on at least onehalf of the jury. Such tremendous impact not only skews the entire trial
process, inviting this error's classification as structural,29 7 but also renders accurate appellate review unattainable.29 8
A related study concerned the effect of group discussion on juror
decision making. 299 This study concluded that where evidence is
predominantly incriminating, jurors will convict with a greater degree of
certainty after discussion with other jurors than before.3 " Therefore, it
appears that group discussion leads to decisions gravitating toward the
nature of the proferred evidence.3 0' If a coerced confession is indeed sui
generis evidence,3 0 2 the degree of "guilt gravitation" is enormous and
arguably undiscernible on review. 3 Thus, psychological research suggests coerced confessions are not amenable to harmless-error review.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Arizona v. Fulminante,3 ° the United States Supreme Court ruled
that improperly admitted coerced confessions were no longer grounds for
automatically reversing a conviction.30 5 Instead, these errors were now
subject to the Chapman harmless-error standard of review. 30 6 In People
v. Cahill,30 7 the California Supreme Court seized upon this "opportunity" to independently reexamine California's treatment of these er295. See id. Clearly, this concern is meaningless in cases where a juror has already reached
a determination regarding guilt or innocence before the introduction of the evidence.
296. See supra part IV.D.1.
297. See supra part IV.B discussing the critical distinction between trial and structural
errors.
298. See supra part IV.D.2.b.
299. See Martin F. Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Judgmentsand Group Discussion: Effect of
Presentationand Memory Factorson Polarization, 40 SOCIOMETRY 337 (1977). For a general
discussion of the jury deliberation process, see Ewart A.C. Thomas & Anthony Hogue, Apparent Weight of Evidence, Decision Criteria,and Confidence Ratings in JurorDecision Making,
83 PSYCHOL. REV. 442 (1976).
300. Kaplan & Miller, supra note 299, at 337.
301. Id.
302. See supra part IV.D.I.
303. See supra part IV.D.2.b.
304. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
305. Id. at 309-10.
306. Id.
307. 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993).
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The Cahill court stated that both California law and prudential

considerations compelled it to adopt the federal standard. 30 9 The Cahill
majority was wrong.

The Cahill court blatantly disregarded over 100 years of principled

31 1
precedent, 3 10 adopted the specious trial-structural error distinction,

slighted considerations of fairness to the defendant, 312 and failed to recognize coerced confessions as sui generis error.3 13
In our "civilized" society, the legal system serves as the substitute

for physical violence in dispute resolution-whether it be in a civil or
criminal context. Our Constitution has implicit safeguards that guard
against primitive, barbaric means of ascertaining truth. The resulting abhorrence that our system of jurisprudence previously maintained regard-

ing coerced confessions manifested itself in the laudable reversible-per-se
rule. Cahill, unfortunately, signifies the return to a more primitive, barbaric truth-seeking era.
Howard S. Liberson *

308. Id. at 500, 853 P.2d at 1052, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597; see also supra note 13 (discussing
state's ability to grant defendants greater rights than federal constitutional minimum).
309. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 510-11, 853 P.2d at 1059-60, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604.05.
310. See supra part IV.A.
311. See supra part IV.B.
312. See supra part IV.C.
313. See supra part IV.D.
* This Note is dedicated to my loving and supportive parents; my brother Joel, who is
both a friend and mentor; and a wonderful young lady, Jennifer. I would also like to thank
Professor Beres for her timely assistance.

